Exam 2 Response for "Nietzsche Kierk Marx," taught by Dr. Miyasaki, Wright State University

November 6th, 2019

Exam 2

1a.

The pursuit of happiness is something everyone cares at least a little about. In Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, two narrators—A and B—have very different viewpoints on how happiness can be attained. Narrator A has a worldview that all people are evil because they are naturally boring, and that to escape one should constantly make limited changes and never commit to things. Narrator B thinks this is based in despair and that commitment provides inward happiness with a sense of eternity, despite mortality’s constraints.

Narrator A thinks “all men" are affected by “ruinous boredom”.1 Boredom caused gods to create man, Eve to sin, and men to build the tower of Babel (60). A babysitter who can’t prevent boredom would be “dismiss[ed]...even if she possessed all other desirable virtues” (60). Whereas “boredom is the root of all evil” (59), idleness is a “divine way of life so long as one is not bored” (62). In fact, those who are not idle and are just “busy in the world” are actually “the most boring...[and] the most insufferable” (62). In people who walk around with their hair on fire, “boredom is not annulled” (63)—even if they don’t acknowledge they are bored—because they aren’t amusing themselves.

Amusement diverts potential chaos and evil by preventing boredom in the first place, as what “stayed the fall of Rome” were bread and circuses (60). To be morally good, you should act on a principle of “crop rotation” where you are “inventive” and “resourceful” in your sources of “amusement” (64). However, selling your house and leaving your family just because you need something different is not advisable, since limitation in the changes is important. A farmer should not replenish a field’s nutrients by renting expensive digging machines to swap out an entire field’s soil when just rotating “the method of cultivation and type of grain” (64) would suffice. Carefulness and caution are needed to “keep reins on the enjoyment from the beginning” (65), seemingly because great happiness that you’ll always remember opens the door to great pain that you can’t forget. This idea is captured when Narrator A says, “Every life situation must possess no more importance than that one can forget it whenever one wants to…but enough importance…to be able at any time to remember it” (64). Life then is a game that can be left whenever one feels boredom’s creep or enjoyment’s allure approaching too swiftly.

In this view, marriage or significant commitment, even “vocational responsibility” (69), should not be entered into. Relationships must “share the speed of the movement for a time...[with] enough speed in hand to be able to run away from it” (67). Marriage to Narrator A is only a “practice and custom” (68), and he thinks it is somewhat inevitable “faithlessness” (68) occurs in a marriage because of boredom’s unrelenting creep. In a literal sense, “eternal love” actually “does not mean very much” because when you can’t move in a grave you can’t love anymore (68). In marriage, you also “have lost your freedom” (68), as the Christian metaphor of becoming one doesn’t account for how you become “several” (68) with commitments that demand your attention. While Kierkegaard writes in Narrator A’s viewpoint, it is likely this reflects his own feelings because of his rejection of commitment with Regine Olsen. Marriage would mean forfeiting the individuality that Kierkegaard heavily espouses.

Narrator B, on the other hand, argues a commitment-free relationship would be more worrisome because “perhaps a brilliant prospect opens for her, she is tempted, she doesn’t resist the temptation—good God, I’d have that on my conscience” (395). This worry would not be ideal on the grounds of maximal happiness—Narrator A’s own terms. Romantic love—in contrast to married love—has “no assurance” (397) and is exteriorly-focused on working to  

please your lover. On the contrary, there is “a blessing of trust that marriage possesses” (396) in the inward part of you. For example, a job interview is a much different conversation than one between two long-time friends, so it is negative that romantic love is “an attempt to live each day as though that day were examination day” (396).

Narrator A’s worldview is fundamentally based in “despair” because it is “entered into by people who have…learnt that real love is an illusion and…a pious wish” (397). In other words, it is despairing to not try because of the risk. Imagine someone who loves playing basketball but had a terrible knee injury in the past. So, every time she plays, she only runs at half speed, despite being fully healed and at no greater risk for another injury. This would be like the lover who, emotionally damaged by past relationships, is afraid to “dive” headfirst into another relationship.

While the romantic lover has “a dead property,” the married lover has a “possession...constantly acquired” (463) because of the continual choice. The married lover is acknowledging how, first, she can’t avoid personal change and, second, she is totally free to change her mind. Nevertheless, she is promising not to change, at least for as long as her life allows. In this way, you can be mortal yet “live in eternity” (463) with individual peace.

3e.

Who are you? Besides being a famous rock song, this question and how it relates to your true self is an important topic to Nietzsche. To him, it’s a process of becoming more individual with help and inspiration from others. Dissatisfaction with the blunder of nature that is yourself motivates you to improve, and by choosing role models to follow you can create your true self.

The first step to finding yourself is asking, “what have [I] truly loved up to now, what has drawn [my] soul aloft…and has mastered it and…blessed it?”2 In other words, what values and themes are present on the stuff you pin on your refrigerator? Only when you know what things to count can you measure where you are in life, and the result naturally leads to dissatisfaction because of your “wretched limitations” (161). These limitations include “changeableness and restlessness” (161), aspects of Schopenhauer’s will. We are also dissatisfied with ourselves because we inherited nature’s drive towards the “more uncommon, more powerful, more complex, [and] more fruitful” (162) individual in the process of evolution. We realize we are essentially “failed work[s] of nature” (162) and then wish to rise higher to “perfect…nature” (160) in those areas we identified are meaningful to us. However, Nietzsche argues that “favourable conditions” are needed to achieve this, and it cannot be achieved alone (162).

Nietzsche talks about “a mighty community held together (160) that people have a natural “longing for” (161). A well-functioning culture is “liberation” (130) and a “means of finding oneself” (130) through role models and educators who inspire and show you “your true nature lies, not concealed deep with you, but immeasurably high above you” (129). We marvel at what our educators created in life and that creation can be inherently meaningful. Nietzsche stresses we are “artistically creating subject[s]”,3 choosing what bridges to cross in life, so our educators inspire us to be masters of our own destinies. For example, teachers instill in us that we can be whatever we want to in the future, and famous musicians create new songs in their original style, inspiring us to be original in our own lives. Nietzsche advises to “attach…[one’s]  

heart to some great man” (Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer” 163), making him or her your role model and either helping that person in a tangible way or fostering the conditions for similar people to rise.

A possible criticism might be that this would make everyone inauthentic and copies of others, but the initial process of finding what has “blessed” and “mastered” your soul requires you to “set up…revered objects before you” (129). The word “objects” in that quote is plural, so there are options and an element of choice as to what your educators will be—an idea that merges individuality and community. An exemplary individual’s contributions can then play a larger role in the overall culture by being one of these revered objects.

Nietzsche argues that we should live “for the good of the rarest” (162), “seek[ing] out and [trying to] create the favourable conditions under which those great redemptive men can come into existence” (162). Even if you aren’t one of the greatest individuals, you can still end up “higher” than you would otherwise be because of the mutual nature of the exchange. For example, a website like Patreon allows many people to donate money to someone who creates YouTube tutorials. There is reciprocity in this system since the greatest individuals are given a crowd-sourced stipend to continue to do their creative work while “the majority” (162) receives help to become more adept in subjects and skills that they value and choose to watch and work on. Nietzsche relates culture to a field where “precious fragments of sculpture” are scattered about unconstructed until people decide to “assist, complete, [and] bring together” (163) the sculptures. Essentially, each individual finds something bigger than themselves in a Nietzschean culture and lives for it.

Personally, I think there are problems with some of his ideas. I do not think that all scenarios of living for the greatest individuals provide ways of achieving “deepest significance” (162). The person that cleans Lebron James’ sweaty socks would likely not feel the most significant in his or her life, though he would be directly assisting someone who many would consider one of the greatest individuals. I also don’t agree with the suggestion that we shouldn’t live for the “majority” or the “least valuable exemplars” (162) because this provides no justification to those who help the needy. Almost all would say that the charity worker helping outcasts of society would have more meaning in life than someone who cleans Lebron James’ socks. In a society that takes this doctrine of living for the greatest too far, the lowly in society might be left behind, creating a kind of survival of the fittest that few would be satisfied with.

Also, practical application of the idea that “nature has done badly” and “serving it so that one day it may do better” (162) might lead to perfectionism because one will think she is not inherently worthy of love or worth without deeds. No child psychologist would encourage the belief in a child that he or she is a mishap. Only with secure attachment do children feel confident enough to venture out on their own, so, likewise, people feeling they are inherently valuable at a basic, acceptable level might be more motivated to “rise…higher” (129). Otherwise, they may give up and think they are too great a mistake or too far below their educators.