Exam 3 Response for "Nietzsche Kierk Marx," taught by Dr. Miyasaki, Wright State University

December 9th, 2019

1B:

Nietzsche criticizes simplistic ideas that a man is fully in control of his will because the will is actually multifaceted, with the part under our control playing only a relatively small part in the process. Therefore, moral responsibility should be renounced for the fabrication it is.

Nietzsche rejects Schopenhauer’s assertion that the will is the true driver of human action. He thinks this is an unwarranted simplification, saying “Willing—seems to me to be above all something complicated.”  He refers to his argument on words in general and how they are just blanket terms for unequal things, saying that “will” as a term “is a unity only in name” (338). He criticizes the idea of a “cause of thought” (337)—what he calls an “ego”— because it is “only a supposition…[and] not an ‘immediate certainty’” (338). In other words, we all, philosophers included, take for granted that we know what thinking is.

The term “will” which Schopenhauer proposed to explain much of our actions and thoughts is made up of at least three (and probably more) things to Nietzsche—sensations, thoughts, and emotions (339). These are the multiple, vital gears in the machine that is the “extremely complex” phenomenon of the will. He calls these gears “‘underwills’ or under-souls” (340), because they are the plural influencers to what we term our soul or will. Because of this nature of the will, “Freedom of the will” is a misconception as it refers to just the commanding part of your ego—"the synthetic term ‘I’” (339)—and ignores how there are obedient parts within yourself that do much of the action behind the scenes. He says, “A man who wills commands something within himself which renders obedience” (339). In other words, when we do something worthwhile there is typically internal resistance.

This process of overcoming our desires leads us astray and is the whole origin of any concept of the “Freedom of the Will” because our “executive instruments” get so good at commanding the other “under-souls” we think that simply “willing [then] suffices for action” (339). In other words, we think that you can accomplish anything if you want it “bad enough.” This is seen in countless self-help books today, but this is a faulty way of thinking that results in a “complex state of delight of the person exercising volition” and reinforcement of the concept of the “Freedom of Will” (340).  There is a collection of such “under-souls”—like the emotion that “this and nothing else is necessary now” (339)—that influence us, but the invented “synthetic term ‘I’” takes the credit. This is similar to when “the governing class,” like an Egyptian pharaoh basking in the glory of a massive pyramid in his name, “identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth” (340). Also, since “we alone…have devised cause…[and] sequence” (341), one shouldn’t assume the executive under-soul freely and individually causes the subsequent action. Nietzsche cautions us that “one should not wrongly materialize ‘cause’ and ‘effect’” (341), positing “the doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment” (364). His logic is that since there are a myriad number of influences in our will apart from those directly under our control, how can men be made responsible for their decisions? Morality was created by “the priests” in order to make people “dependent upon them.”  If you had a choice, then you are responsible for your actions, so in a world where “men were considered ‘free’ ….they [could] be judged and punished” (364). An optimal world then, to Nietzsche, is one where “nobody is held responsible any longer” (365). Religions like Christianity, then, have created responsibility which only “infect[s] the innocence of becoming by means of ‘punishment’ and ‘guilt’” (364).

I do not agree that priests created all moral responsibility, because it seems there are some actions that are inherently, objectively wrong—like rape. Nietzsche might respond by saying rape is just a very strong social taboo that thereby feels like an objective moral wrong. However, I would respond that it feels very strange to say rape is just a social taboo, like passing gas in an elevator, since if you ask a random person whether rape is wrong they would almost invariably say “certainly” rather than a more ambiguous response. Its wrongness feels more substantiated than some specific, priest-devised theological doctrine like predestination. Also, behaviors like a contagious yawn in a group are species-specific from brain structures, so rape as well may be hardwired in us as “wrong.” Just the fact that something “wrong” feels more deeply engrained in the human experience means it is unlikely nothing but the contrivances of a scheming religious leadership.

I also do not agree with the assertion there is no freedom of the will whatsoever, because it seems that with his concept of the “under-souls” there is certainly some freedom of the will. He throws the baby out with the bath water by saying there shouldn’t be any sense of responsibility. Nietzsche might respond by saying it is the other non-executive under-souls that do most of the work of the will so there is a trivial amount of freedom in the will (hence no freedom of the will). This would indeed align with his analogy of the governing class being the predominating party that takes credit for the work of the majority. However, I would respond that his analogy is inconsistent, for why would the executive instruments be the governing class if they did not have the largest effect of any of the under-souls? This executive instrument is dominant over the other parts and thus has a nonzero influence in the will. So, it follows that more empathy should be had when regarding people’s decisions, since there are influences in our wills that are indeed out of our control—anxiety, obsessive thoughts, and the need for sleep to name a few. However, to say that responsibility among people should be entirely abdicated makes it seem like he has taken “a popular prejudice and exaggerated it” (338). I also take objection at his claim that our sense of a self—“a One”—is “only a supposition…[and] not an ‘immediate certainty’” (338), because why does every human in every culture receive a name? Dolphins, chimpanzees, gorillas, and humans are all able to recognize themselves in mirrors, which implies that there is more certainty to the idea of some kind of self. Even if words are terms for unequal things, making the term “I” imprecise, there is still a universal idea in many organisms of a base reference point beginning from the head’s spatial location to the physical outside. This makes the self a natural thing and not entirely synthetic as he describes.

3E:

Because women are ascribed honor without the accompanying of deeds, they have fewer opportunities and can’t be morally good. This effect is more pronounced in wealthy, dependent women than women of more meager means who are able to more readily exercise their intellect without wealth and dependence.

Mary Wollstonecraft dislikes how women receive “a degree of attention and respect from strangers different from that…between man and man” (1264). She likens it to being in a cage like a bird with nothing to do but “stalk with mock majesty from perch to perch” (1264). This treatment might be considered preferable, but the “trivial attentions…are insultingly supporting their [men’s] own superiority” (1264). It seems the intention of such gender-specific behaviors is what matters, as Wollstonecraft says, “I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of sex confounded in society, unless where love animates the behavior” (1264). In her day, though, it seems more common for a man to be “cold-hearted” (1264) and “lift a handkerchief” with a “manner…of his own superiority” (1265).

She thinks that women are not able, because of the “state of civilisation (sic)” (1265), to “claim respect on account of their great abilities or daring virtues” (165). The admiration they receive is ill-founded, often based on “wealth and beauty” which the “the vulgar eye of common minds” is attracted to (1265). The French King Louis XIV “was regarded…as the most perfect model of a great prince” not because of any “exquisite judgement…or…heroic valour” but because “his historian” wrote flattering things about him (1266). It was recorded that Louis “surpassed all his courtiers in the gracefulness of his shape…[and] gained those hearts which his presence intimidated” (1266), but these are “frivolous accomplishments” (1266) to Wollstonecraft. Likewise, a woman culturally receives respect that is needlessly “all…built on her loveliness” (1266).

Being placed on this pedestal leads a moral problem. This is especially problematic for women “of a superior cast” (1277) because they are subject to the damaging effects of wealth and are dependent on their husbands. A women with wealth quickly “neglect[s] domestic duties” because others are hired to do it, and with no option to be “soldiers [or] statesmen” (1278) this leads to moral corruption because “virtue…must be acquired by rough toils” (1263). Their dependence leaves them with no way to exercise their intellect other than deciding how to give “superfluous money…to the needy and…buy[ing] books” (1277). A woman then begins “to pursue some frothy pleasure, or to invent some frivolous fashion” due to how they are “weak in mind and body” (1279). She says, “to render her really virtuous and useful…she must not be dependent on her husband’s bounty for her subsistence” (1279). She thinks this makes a woman a slave, for “how can a being be generous who has nothing of its own? Or virtuous who is not free” (1279).

However, women of lower class do have more “rough toils” (1263). They often are forced to tend to their children and perform the duties of housewife and mother themselves, but this is “the happiest as well as the most respectable situation in the world” (1277). They are in the sweet spot, being “sufficiently above abject poverty not to be obliged to weight the consequence of every farthing” (1277). The old maxim is true, the more money you own (or vicariously own) the more it owns you. Also, there is no unequal dependence for a poor woman, because both are “equally necessary and independent of each other” (1277)—the woman using her intellect to take care of the house and kids and the husband lovingly providing without an air of superiority. She extends her dislike of unequal relationships to all “preposterous distinctions of rank,” declaring them “a curse” because respect is given not “to the discharge of the relative duties of life, but to the station” (1278). A societal meritocracy rather than a monarchy is what she calls for.

I do not think that being dependent on a man for all your subsistence necessarily leads to being “debased and cramped” (1278). It seems entirely possible that women can “unfold their faculties” while in a situation like this and be morally good. For example, Melinda Gates, a women heavily dependent on the money her husband—Bill Gates—has accumulated through Microsoft, does not seem to have a “narrow…mind” (1277)—she gives speeches about leadership and life goals at conferences like the Global Leadership Summit—or a “narrow…heart” (1277)—she routinely travels to Africa to help with the malaria epidemic. Many people would say they admire her (I certainly do), and most people would call her humanitarian work morally good, which throws doubt on Wollstonecraft’s assertions. Wollstonecraft might respond that she outwardly performs these good actions but secretly feels like a slave to her husband, but why wouldn’t Melinda divorce her husband? Today’s liberal divorce laws provide an easy way out if she felt stifled in any way. Wollstonecraft’s view that women are caged birds may have been more relevant in a time and place where women couldn’t feasibly divorce without considerable negative effects, but today the stigma of divorce is less and more economic opportunities apart from a husband exist for wealthy woman.

I agree with her notion all gender-specific actions of chivalry should be done away with because it implies a sense of weakness in the female. A possible objection to this is that the act can be done with good intent, especially in modern times where equality is the norm, so why is this a problem? Wollstonecraft might respond by saying that a man holding a door only for females and not for men, despite the intent, perpetuates the problematic custom. In an analogy, many are against the use of the Confederate flag because it is often taken as a symbol for racial divide, despite it potentially being displayed with the best of intentions as reminiscent of antebellum simplicity. Likewise, since women are perfectly able to open the door for themselves, specifically opening the door for a women (regardless of the intention) allows an archaic practice and hence belief to potentially live on, negatively impacting women.